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IMPACT FEES IN MARYLAND 
Paul A. Tiburzit 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sprawling residential development in Maryland has forced local offi-
cials to seek new revenue sources to pay for the infrastructure necessary 
to support that development. Water and sewer facilities, stormwater 
drains, roads, sidewalks, parks, schools, firehouses, and police stations all 
must be built and financed. Traditionally, capital improvements of this 
nature have been financed with the proceeds of municipal bonds and with 
federal grant money. Usage fees,l benefit assessments2 and property 
taxes3 provided the funds for paying the debt service on the bonds. But 
rapid and unrestrained suburban growth, coupled with the decline in fed-
eral grant programs, has placed inordinate demands on municipal fi-
nances.4 Many localities - approaching their limits on bonded 
indebtedness and fearful of incurring taxpayers' ire - have realized that 
they cannot meet the needs of new development and still maintain ex-
isting facilities without an additional source of funds. For a growing 
number of Maryland counties and municipal corporations, impact fees 
have provided that source. 
Impact fees have two essential features: (1) they shift the cost of 
capital improvements from all users or taxpayers in the jurisdiction to 
the new residents who create the need for them, and (2) they are col-
t B.A., 1977, Loyola College; J.~., 1980, University of Maryland School of Law. 
Partner, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, Maryland. An earlier version of this article 
was presented at the March, 1988 Land Use Institute of the Maryland Institute for 
the Continuing Professional Education of Lawyers, Inc. The author would like to 
thank John Messina, an associate at Piper & Marbury, for his assistance in prepar-
ing this article. 
1. A "usage fee" is a charge based on the property owner's consumption of a given 
public service. See 2 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 190.04, at 
190-8 to -9 (1988); see, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, § 4-110(d) (1986) (sewer 
usage charge). This fee can encompass not only the cost of the service used, but also 
the costs of expanding and improving the service. See, e.g., White Rock Sewage 
Corp. v. Township of Monroe, 77 Pa. Commw. 119, 465 A.2d 102 (1983) (sewage 
rate ordinance that included expenses relating to repair and depreciation was 
permissible). 
2. A "benefit assessment" is a charge imposed by a local government upon property 
owners to pay for municipal improvements which benefit the property. See 2 C. 
ANTIEAU, supra note 1, § 14.00, at 14-5; 14 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 38.01, at 12 (3d ed. rev. 1987). This assessment may be apportioned among 
the owners of property according to the value of the property, the frontage of the 
property benefited by the public improvement, or the value of the benefits received 
by each property owner. See generally 14 E. MCQUILLIN, supra, §§ 38.121 to .133, 
at 345-86. 
3. A "property tax" has been defined by the Maryland Court of Appeals as "a charge 
on the owner of property by reason of his ownership alone without regard to any uSe 
that might be made of it." Weaver v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 349, 357, 
379 A.2d 399, 403 (1977). 
4. See generally 1987 ZoNING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK § 15.01, at 276-77 
(N. Gordon ed. 1987). 
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lected before the improvements are constructed rather than after they are 
in service. S Impact fees are imposed on every new house, condominium, 
apartment, or other dwelling unit in proportion to the impact the unit 
will make on the public infrastructure.6 An impact fee, at least in the-
ory, represents the proportionate share of the capital costs of providing 
a municipal service to an individual dwelling unit or other consuming 
unit which begins using that service for the first time.7 
Imposition of impact fees may be contrasted to the traditional capi-
tal financing method under which necessary funds are borrowed and the 
debt service costs are passed on to all customers or taxpayers through 
higher usage charges or taxes. Unlike these assessments, an impact fee is 
an up-front, one-time charge.8 In financing water supply or sewage col-
lection and treatment facilities, for example, the impact fee (or "special 
connection charge," as it is usually called in this context) would be due 
and payable when the builder or developer applies for service. The im-
pact fee is separate from, and imposed in addition to, the usual connec-
tion charges which are designed to recoup only the cost of making 
individual connections from a water or sewer main in the street to the 
property line of an abutting lot. After the unit is connected to the system 
it is also subject to taxes or usage charges. 
Builders and developers are the hardest hit by impact fees because in 
most cases they must pay the charges up front without any assurance 
that they will be able to recoup their costs later through higher house or 
lot prices. Builders and developers in areas subject to impact fees may 
be at a competitive disadvantage if the price of their homes includes a 
substantial cost that does not appear in homes sold in other areas.9 For 
this reason, builders and developers historically have been opposed to 
5. For an excellent overview of impact fees, see Eveleth, The Cost of Growth: Impact 
Fees, MD. B.J., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 16; see also Morgan, Duncan, McClendon & 
Standerfer, Drafting Impact Fee Ordinances: Legal Foundation for Exactions, 9 
ZONING & PLAN. L. REp., July-Aug. 1986, at 49; Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact 
Fees: An Answer to Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. 
REv. 415 (1981). 
6. See Eveleth, supra note 5, at 17; Samuel, Impact Fees a Step Closer in Arundel, The 
Daily Record, Sept. 9, 1986, at 1, col. 4 (reporting Anne Arundel County's pro-
posed impact fees). 
7. See Eveleth, supra note 5, at 17. Impact fees may also be assessed to an existing 
development which is expanding its use of municipal services. See, e.g., ANNE AR-
UNDEL COUNTY CODE art. 24, § 7-103(B) (1988). 
8. See Eveleth, supra note 5, at 17. 
9. Dr. James Nicholas, an associate director of growth management studies at the Uni-
versity of Florida's Holland School of Law (and a national authority on impact 
fees), has argued that "[i]mpact fees do not lead to higher prices for new home 
buyers" because, "in general, developers have absorbed the cost of impact fees by 
taking a lower profit, and have not passed them along to the home buyer." Samuel, 
Impact Fees a Step Closer In Arundel, The Daily Record, Sept. 9, 1986, at 1, col. 4 
(reporting Dr. Nicholas' remarks to a conference of the Maryland chapter of the 
American Planning Association). 
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impact fees. \0 
The purpose of this article is to examine the principal legal issues 
associated with impact fees in Maryland. Because builders, developers or 
new residents may file suit to prevent the imposition of impact fees, gov-
ernment officials and their counsel should consider and resolve the argu-
ments that may be raised in such a challenge before implementing an 
impact fee program. Each issue must be analyzed within the legal 
framework established by the general and local laws applicable to 
whatever county, municipal corporation, or other governmental body 
seeks to use the impact fee financing method; what is true for one 
county or municipal corporation may not be true for another. 
This article will attempt to identify and analyze the most significant 
issues that have been addressed in Maryland and other jurisdictions re-
garding impact fees. The important areas of analysis are: (1) the statu-
tory authority to impose impact fees, (2) the reasonableness of impact 
fees, (3) restrictions on the use of impact fees, (4) fifth amendment "tak-
ings" challenges to impact fees, and (5) fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection challenges to impact fees. 
II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR IMPACT FEES 
Because counties, municipal corporations, and other local govern-
mental bodies are creatures of the state, they can exercise only those 
powers delegated to them by the Maryland General Assembly.!! They 
cannot charge impact fees, therefore, unless they have been authorized to 
do so by statute. Maryland courts have been strict in construing the ex-
tent of local governmental bodies' powers to raise revenues. For exam-
ple, in Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. G.l Mitchell & 
Best CO.,!2 one of two Maryland appellate decisions involving impact 
fees, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Washington Subur-
ban Sanitary Commission ("WSSC") lacked the statutory authority to 
impose a special connection charge known as the System Expansion Off-
set Charge ("Offset Charge").!3 WSSC had been collecting the Offset 
Charge from developers to finance a substantial portion of the long-term 
debt service costs resulting from WSSC's expansion of its water and 
10. See, e.g., Wheeler, Lines Forming In Arundel To Blast "Impact Fee" Plan, Balti-
more Evening Sun, Apr. 16, 1987, at C6, col. 4. 
11. See Nevenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 187 Md. 67, 74, 
48 A.2d 593, 597 (1946) (municipal corporations are creatures of the State and are 
subject to the absolute control of the legislature); Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376, 
462 (1860) (counties are created by and subject to the control of the legislature). 
12. 303 Md. 544,495 A.2d 30 (1985). For a discussion of another aspect of the case, see 
infra text accompanying notes 86-87. 
13. G.l Mitchell & Best Co., 303 Md. at 563-71,495 A.2d at 39-44. The Washington 
Suburban Sanitation Commission ("WSSC") was created by the legislature to pro-
vide for construction, operation and maintenance of sewer and water service in the 
Washington Suburban Sanitary District, comprising most of Prince George's and 
Montgomery Counties. See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, §§ 1-102, 3-101 to 
-301 (1986 & Supp. 1988). 
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sewer systems to accommodate new development. 14 The court held that 
because WSSC is a public corporation created by an Act of the General 
Assemblyl5 it must have specific statutory authority for its rates and 
charges. 16 WSSC's enabling statute identifies only three possible revenue 
sources for payment ofWSSC's debt service - ad valorem taxes,17 front-
foot benefit charges,18 and usage charges. 19 The court concluded that 
the Offset Charge was not one of those authorized sources and was there-
fore invalid.20 
In Northampton Corp. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-
sion,21 on the other hand, the Maryland Court of Appeals found author-
ity for WSSC's Interim Sewer Service Charge ("Interim Charge"), a one-
time charge imposed on new sewer connections to fund the construction 
of three "interim" sewage treatment plants.22 Because existing treatment 
facilities were overburdened, the state health department had imposed a 
moratorium on new sewer connections and had directed WSSC to ex-
pand its sewage treatment facilities. 23 WSSC designed the interim plants 
as a temporary solution until permanent facilities could be built. The 
court held that WSSC had statutory authority to impose the Interim 
Charge because it was designed to satisfy an "extraordinary expense. "24 
The distinction between the two cases is that the Interim Charge 
funds were used directly to finance the construction of interim facilities 
which were required to cure an extraordinary problem, but the Offset 
Charge proceeds were used to pay debt service on municipal bonds issued 
for routine financing of the construction of permanent facilities. 
Although impact fees were not involved in Baltimore County v. Se-
curity Mortgage Corp., 25 the decision of the court of appeals strongly sug-
gests that a county has no power to impose impact fees without specific 
authorization from the General Assembly. The court held that Balti-
more County could not force a developer to contribute to the cost of a 
14. C.l Mitchell & Best Co., 303 Md. at 569-70, 495 A.2d at 43. 
15. Act of April 10, 1918, ch. 122, 1918 Md. Laws 248 (codified as amended at MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 29 (1986 & Supp. 1988)). 
16. C.l Mitchell & Best Co., 303 Md. at 564, 495 A.2d at 39-40. 
17. MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, § 4-105(a) (1986). 
18. [d. §§ 4-107, 5-101 to -109 (1986 & Supp. 1988). 
19. [d. §§ 4-106, 4-11O(d). 
20. C.l Mitchell & Best Co., 303 Md. at 569, 495 A.2d at 42. Nevertheless, the court 
held that WSSC need not refund any amounts collected under the Offset Charge 
because the plaintiffs had paid the charge "voluntarily," within the meaning of 
Maryland's stringent voluntary payment rule, rather than seeking an injunction 
prohibiting its imposition wh.ile the litigation was pending. [d. at 571-78, 495 A.2d 
at 44-47. 
21. 278 Md. 677, 366 A.2d 377 (1976). For a discussion of another aspect of the case, 
see infra text accompanying notes 106-07. 
22. Northampton Corp., 278 Md. at 680-82, 366 A.2d at 379-80. 
23. [d. at 680, 366 A.2d at 379. 
24. [d. at 683,366 A.2d at 380-81 (quoting section 6-1(b) of the Washington Suburban 
Sanitary District Code, MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, § 6-101(b) (1986 & Supp. 1988)). 
25. 227 Md. 234, 175 A.2d 755 (1961). 
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bridge that had to be built to handle the increased traffic his development 
would generate but which would be located outside of the development. 
The court explained: 
A [county] in the absence of an enforceable contract or statu-
tory authority cannot, as a prerequisite to approval of a subdi~ 
vision plat, require a developer or owner to defray the cost and 
expense of land improvements which lie beyond the owner or 
developer's property and are located on land owned by 
others. 26 
If a particular impact fee is designed to force developers to pay for off-
site improvements required to serve their developments, the reasoning of 
this decision would apply with equal force to the imposition of such an 
impact fee. 27 
A. Counties' Authority to Impose Impact Fees 
Maryland is divided into twenty-three counties which fall into three 
categories: county commissioner counties,28 code counties,29 and charter 
counties.30 Counties comprising the latter two categories have certain 
home-rule powers, with charter counties being more autonomous. Arti-
cle 25 of the Maryland Annotated Code sets forth the general31 and enu-
merated32 powers of county commissioner counties. Because article 25 
does not confer general authority to impose impact fees, county commis-
sioner counties must seek specific authorization from the General Assem-
bly. The General Assembly has authorized five commissioner counties to 
impose impact fees: St. Mary's,33 Charles,34 Carroll,3s Calvert,36 and 
26. [d. at 239, 175 A.2d at 757. 
27. It may be argued, however, that Security Mortgage is of limited importance because 
the court did not discuss Baltimore County's home-rule powers. A proper county 
ordinance might have led to a different result in the case. 
28. There are eleven county commissioner counties: Calvert, Carroll, Cecil, Charles, 
Dorchester, Frederick, Garrett, Queen Anne's, St. Mary's, Somerset, and 
Washington. 
29. There are four code counties: Allegany, Caroline, Kent, and Worcester. 
30. There are eight charter counties: Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Harford, Howard, 
Montgomery, Prince George's, Talbot, and Wicomico. Baltimore City also has a 
charter form of government. For a more detailed discussion of the differing forms 
of county government, see Moser, County Home Rule - Sharing the State's Legisla-
tive Power with Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. REv. 327 (1968). 
,31. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, § 1 (1987) 
32. [d. § 3 (1987 & Supp. 1988). 
33. St. Mary's County has statutory authority to impose what may be the functional 
equivalent of impact fees. See Act of May 31,1974, ch. 814,1974 Md. Laws 2729 
(codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, § lOD-l (1987)) (authorizing col-
lection of "building permit fees" to defray the cost of "additional educational, 
water, sewage, road, sanitation, or similar facilities"). 
34. Act of May 21, 1973, ch. 642, 1973 Md. Laws 1291 (codified as amended at MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 5.08 (1988)) (authorizing collection of a fee to "compensate 
the county for the burden the development will impose in terms of the additional 
public facilities which will have to be provided .... "). 
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Queen Anne's. 37 
Code counties have been given limited home rule powers. Under 
article XI-F of the Maryland Constitution they may enact, amend, or 
repeal their own "public local laws."38 Article 25B of the Maryland 
Code sets forth the powers of code counties,39 and within those areas the 
General Assembly may not legislate for the county, except by general 
enactments applicable to all code counties.40 Under the Maryland Con-
stitution, however, a code county may not levy any type of new tax or fee 
without the express authorization of the General Assembly in the form of 
a general law for all code counties.41 The General Assembly has not 
authorized code counties to impose impact fees. 
Charter counties have the greatest degree of local autonomy. Arti-
cle XI-A of the Maryland Constitution directs the General Assembly to 
provide a grant of express powers to charter counties.42 The Express 
Powers Act43 delegates more than thirty different areas of power to the 
charter counties. 
None of those provisions, however, authorizes the imposition of im-
pact fees. Section 5(0) of the Express Powers Act confers tax and assess-
ment powers on charter counties.44 Despite the relative breadth of 
section 5(0), the courts have held that the General Assembly granted to 
charter counties only "limited taxing power."4S In Montgomery County 
v. Maryland Soft Drink Association,46 neither the court of appeals nor 
Montgomery County challenged the Soft Drink Association's contention 
that section 5(0) granted the power to levy only ordinary taxes, i.e., 
35. Act of April 14, 1987, ch. 108, 1987 Md. Laws 536 (codified at MD. ANN. CoDE 
art. 25, § 9F (Supp. 1988» (authorizing collection of "development impact fees for 
financing . . . the capital costs of additional or expanded public works. . . . "). 
36. Act of May 14, 1987, ch. 326, 1987 Md. Laws 1895 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 25, § 9G (Supp. 1988» (authorizing collection of "development impact fees for 
financing ... the capital costs of additional or expanded public works .... "). 
37. Act of May 17, 1988, ch. 410, 1988 Md. Laws 3132 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 25, § 9H (Supp. 1988» (authorizing collection of "development impact fees for 
financing ... the capital costs of additional or expanded public works .... "). Legis-
lation which would have authorized Washington County to impose impact fees was 
introduced at the 1988 session of the General Assembly as House Bill No. 166 but 
did not pass. 
38. MD. CoNST. art XI-F, § 3. A "public local law" is a law "applicable to the incorpo-
ration, organization, or government of a code county and contained in the county's 
code of public local laws." Id. § 1. 
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25B, § 13 (1987). 
40. MD. CoNST. art. XI-F, § 4. 
41. Id. § 9. 
42. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 2. 
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5 (1987 & Supp. 1988). 
44. Id. § 5(0). 
45. Reinhardt v. Anne Arundel County, 31 Md. App. 355, 373, 356 A.2d 917, 927 
(1976) (emphasis in original) (quoted in Montgomery County v. Maryland Soft 
Drink Ass'n, 281 Md. 116, 130, 377 A.2d 486, 494 (1977»; see also Montgomery 
Bd. of Realtors v. Montgomery County, 287 Md. 101, 107,411 A.2d 97, 100 (1980) 
(section 5(0) "appears to grant no general taxing power"). 
46. 281 Md. 116,377 A.2d 486 (1977). 
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property taxes. The Maryland Attorney General has also concluded that 
the Express Powers Act confers the power to levy only property taxes.47 
An impact fee mayor may not be construed to be a tax. If it is not a tax, 
it clearly falls outside the scope of section 5(0). But even if the impact 
fee is considered a tax, it is definitely not a property tax, which the court 
of appeals has defined as "a charge on the owner of property by reason of 
his ownership alone without regard to any use that might be made of 
it."48 Therefore, impact fees are not specifically authorized by the Ex-
press Powers Act. 
An individual charter county's ability to impose impact fees may be 
further limited by section four of article XI-A of the Maryland Constitu-
tion. Section four prohibits the General Assembly from legislating 
within those "subjects covered by" the Express Powers Act except by 
general laws that apply to two or more counties.49 In Maryland Soft 
Drink Association, the court of appeals found that for purposes of article 
XI -A, "the entire. subject of taxation is not 'covered' by the Express Pow-
ers Act."sO The Maryland Soft Drink Association case involved the con-
stitutionality of chapter 808 of the Maryland Laws of 1963, which 
authorized Montgomery County to exercise "in addition to any and all 
taxing powers heretofore granted by the General Assembly, the power to 
tax to the same extent as the state," with certain enumerated excep-
tions.sl As noted above, the court held that the Express Powers Act 
granted a very limited taxing power. 52 The broad taxing powers con-
ferred by chapter 808 thus were not restricted by being a "subject cov-
ered by" the Express Powers Act. It was therefore appropriate for the 
General Assembly to enact chapter 808 as a local law applicable only to 
Montgomery County. 
The Maryland Soft Drink Association court also cited with approval 
Reinhardt v. Anne Arundel County. 53 In Reinhardt, the court of special 
appeals examined the constitutionality of section 411 C of article 81 of the 
Maryland Annotated Code. 54 Section 411C conferred upon Anne Arun-
del County the authority to levy sales or use taxes on fuels, utilities, and 
telephone service. 55 Noting that in enacting the Express Powers Act, the 
General Assembly "did not surrender its right to enact local legislation 
in areas not included within the Express Powers Act's grant of taxing 
power," the court found that section 411C was a valid local law applica-
47. 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 202 (1976). 
48. Weaver v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 349, 357, 379 A.2d 399, 403 (1977). 
49. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 2. 
50. Maryland Soft Drink Ass'n, 281 Md. at 130,377 A.2d at 494. 
51. Act of May 6, 1963, ch. 808, 1963 Md. Laws 1703 (codified at MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY CODE § 52-17 (1984». 
52. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
53. 31 Md. App. 355, 356 A.2d 917, cert. denied, 278 Md. 731 (1976). 
54. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 411C (1980). 
55.Id. 
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ble only to Anne Arundel County.56 Thus, the court concluded that the 
subject of use and sales taxes was not "covered by" the Express Powers 
Act. 57 
If impact fees are not considered to be a tax of any sort, then they 
are clearly not within a "subject covered by" the Express Powers Act, 
and the General Assembly can enact a local law applicable to only one 
charter county empowering the county to impose such a fee. Even if the 
fee is construed as a special tax, Maryland Soft Drink Association and 
Reinhardt strongly suggest that because it is not an ordinary tax within a 
"subject covered by" the Express Powers Act, the Act does not limit the 
General Assembly's authority to enable a specific charter county to im-
pose the fee. 
Accordingly, impact fees are not within a "subject covered by" the 
Express Powers Act, and the Maryland Constitution does not prohibit 
the General Assembly from authorizing one charter county to impose 
impact fees under a public locallaw.58 Anne Arundel County received 
authorization in 1986.59 No other charter county has sought such 
authority. 
B. Municipal Corporations' Authority To Impose Impact Fees 
Under the Maryland constitution a municipal corporation must 
have the "express authorization of the General Assembly" before it can 
impose any type of new tax or fee. 60 The authorization must be in the 
form of a ge~eral law applicable to every municipal corporation in the 
state, rather than a special or local law applicable to a particular munici-
pal corporation. 61 The Attorney General of Maryland has concluded 
that the General Assembly has expressly authorized all municipal corpo-
56. Reinhardt, 31 Md. App. at 373, 356 A.2d at 927. 
57. Id. Further support for the proposition that the Express Powers Act "covers" only 
a limited "subject" as to taxation comes from a Maryland Attorney General Opin-
ion on House Bill No. 990 which was introduced at the 1976 General Assembly. 61 
Op. Att'y Gen. 202 (1976). House Bill No. 990, if enacted, would have applied to 
Anne Arundel County alone and would have required the county to impose a "dif-
ferential tax rate" on Annapolis residents. The Attorney General found nothing in 
the bill "to suggest that it relat[ed] to [anything] other than property taxes." Id. at 
203. Because House Bill No. 990 related to a subject covered by the Express Powers 
Act - property taxes - the Bill, if enacted, would have violated the local law 
prohibition of article XI-A, section 4. 
58. Section 9 of article XI-F of the Maryland Constitution, which prevents the General 
Assembly from empowering a single code county to impose fees or taxes, has no 
counterpart in article XI-A. See supra text accompanying note 41; see also 64 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 296 (1979). 
59. Act of May 13, 1986, ch. 350, 1986 Md. Laws 1365 (codified at ANNE ARUNDEL 
COUNTY CODE art. 24, § 7-113 (1988» (authorizing the county to impose "develop-
ment impact fees" to finance "the capital costs of additional or expanded public 
works, improvements, and facilities required to accommodate new construction or 
development"). 
60. MD. CONST. art. XI-E, § 5. 
61. Id. The Maryland Constitution requires only that the general law apply to all mu-
nicipal corporations within a particular class, as defined by the General Assembly. 
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rations to impose impact fees for certain purposes.62 That authorization 
is found in section 2(b)(33)(ii) of article 23A of the Maryland Annotated 
Code, which empowers municipal corporations "to establish and collect 
reasonable fees and charges ... [a]ssociated with the exercise of any gov-
ernmental or proprietary function authorized by law to be exercised by a 
municipal corporation. "63 
The Attorney General's opinion was written in response to a ques-
tion about an impact fee proposal in Ocean City. The Governor had 
announced plans for a beach restoration project to counteract the accel-
erated erosion of the shoreline caused by extensive development in Ocean 
City.64 Legislation was proposed to create an "Ocean Beach Replenish-
ment Fund" with appropriations from the State Treasury.65 Ocean City 
and Worcester County were required to provide at least half of the 
money needed for any projects other than land acquisition.66 Ocean City 
proposed to impose an impact fee on all new development and requested 
the Attorney General's opinion on the legality of the proposal. 67 
The Attorney General reviewed the "express authorization" re-
quirement of the Maryland Constitution68 and concluded that "Article 
23A, [section] 2(b)(33)(ii) does constitute sufficiently express authoriza-
tion" for the proposed impact fees. 69 Section 2(b)(33) was enacted by the 
General Assembly in 1981 as "emergency" legislation70 to reverse the 
effect of a court of appeals decision 71 that "sharply curtailed the power of 
municipalities to license and impose fees upon various activities."72 The 
General Assembly intended to "restore to municipal corporations the 
broad authority 'heretofore thought to exist' to levy fees and charges in 
connection with their lawful powers."73 According to the Attorney Gen-
Id. The General Assembly, however, has determined that all municipal corpora-
tions are in the same class. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 10 (1987). 
62. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. 87, 89 (1986). 
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 2(b)(33)(ii) (1987 & Supp. 1988). 
64. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. at 88. 
65. See H.B. 472, § 1 (1986) (proposing new sections 8-1105.2 and 8-1105.3 of the Nat-
ural Resources Article); S.B. 272, § 1 (1986) (same). 
66. See H.B. 472, § 1 (1986) (proposing new sections 8-1105.2(H)(2), (1)(1) of the Natu-
ral Resources Article); S.B. 272, § 1 (1986) (same). 
67. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. at 88. 
68. MD. CONST. art. XI-E, § 5. 
69. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. at 89. 
70. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 565, 1981 Md. Laws 2299. 
71. See Campbell v. City of Annapolis, 289 Md. 300,424 A.2d 738 (1981). Campbell 
involved the issue of whether a license fee imposed by the City of Annapolis upon 
owners of residential rental units was valid in light of the restrictions contained in 
section five of article XI-E of the Maryland Constitution. Id. at 301, 424 A.2d at 
739. Finding that the licensing fee was not expressly authorized by the General 
Assembly, the court concluded that the fee, whether intended for regulatory or reve-
nue-raising purposes, was prohibited by section five of article XI-E. Id. at 306-12, 
424 A.2d at 742-44. 
72. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. at 90. 
73. 67 Op. Att'y Gen. 307, 310 (1982) (quoting Bill Review Letter from Stephen H. 
Sachs, Attorney General, to Harry Hughes, Governor (May 14, 1981». 
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eral, the restoration of the beach at Ocean City was an "appropriate gov-
ernmental function" within the requirement of section 2(b)(33)(ii).74 
Therefore, the Attorney General concluded that Ocean City had statu-
tory authorization to impose the impact fees. 75 
Ironically, the Express Powers AcC6 contains no similar provision 
authorizing charter counties or code counties to impose impact fees. 
Hence there exists the anomalous situation in which Maryland's smallest 
municipal corporations may impose impact fees for certain purposes, 
while some of the largest and most autonomous counties in the state may 
not. 
C General Authority to Impose Water & Sewer Impact Fees 
As the previous discussion demonstrates, local governments, 
whether a county, municipal corporation, or sanitary district, presently 
possess only limited authority to impose impact fees. The General As-
sembly, however, has authorized the imposition of specific types of im-
pact fees. For example, section 9-722 of the Environment Article of the 
Maryland Annotated Code authorizes all counties, sanitary districts, and 
municipal corporations to impose water and sewer impact fees ("special 
connection charges") to defray the debt service costs of expanding or 
improving their water and sewerage systems: 
To provide funds for the payment of principal and interest on 
indebtedness that is incurred to finance any water or sewerage 
system, a political subdivision [defined to include counties, mu-
nicipal corporations, commissions, and districts] may: ... 
[e]stablish a reasonable charge that is not less than the actual 
cost, payable to the political subdivision,jor connection with a 
water or sewerage system . . . .77 
Many counties, including for example, Anne Arundel County78 and 
Howard County79 have imposed such charges. These "special connec-
tion charges" are imposed in addition to the standard connection charges 
which cover the cost of connecting individual lots to the water and sewer 
mains. 
Additionally, section 9-656 of the Environment Article of the Mary-
land Annotated Code separately authorizes sanitary commissions to im-
pose special connection charges like the Offset Charge. It provides as 
follows: 
To pay the principal and interest on bonds issued under this 
74. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. at 90. 
75. Id. at 97. 
76. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5 (1987 & Supp. 1988). 
77. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-722(a)(I) (1987) (emphasis supplied). 
78. See ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY CODE art. 6, § 5-208(e) (1988)("capital facility con-
nection charge"). 
79. See HOWARD COUNTY CODE § 20.311 (1977) ("in-aid-of construction charge"). 
512 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
subtitle, a sanitary commission may set reasonable benefit as-
sessments and reasonable connection charges. . . . [Such 
charges] shall be equal at least to the cost of making the connec-
tion between a water system or sewerage system and the prop-
erty served by that system. 80 
D. Implied Authority Doctrine 
If a governmental body lacks specific statutory authority for impos-
ing impact fees, it may argue that it has implied authority to impose 
them under "Dillon's Rule." That rule provides that municipal corpora-
tions have the following powers: "those granted in express words; . . . 
those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly 
granted; ... [and] those essential to the declared objects and purposes of 
the corporation - not simply convenient, but indispensable."81 Variants 
of this rule have been applied to counties,82 municipal corporations, 83 
state agencies,84 and other governmental entities.8s 
In Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. C.L Mitchell & 
Best Co., 86 the court of appeals rejected WSSC's argument that it had the 
implied power to impose the Offset Charge. Express provisions in 
WSSC's governing statute limited the revenue sources for the payment of 
debt service to ad valorem taxes, front-foot benefit charges, and sewer 
and water user charges.87 Were there no specific statutory provisions 
supporting alternative revenue sources, the implied power argument 
would, of course, be far stronger. 
III. THE REASONABLENESS OF IMPACT FEES 
A. Reasonableness In Principle 
Although the issue has not yet extensively been discussed by the 
Maryland courts, the implicit reasonableness of impact fees has been up-
80. MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-656(a)(1), (b)(1) (1987) (emphasis supplied). 
81. J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 173 (2d ed. 1873), reprinted in 1 C. AN-
TlEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW, § 3.01, at 97 (1968) (emphasis in 
original). 
82. See, e.g., Howard County v. Matthews, 146 Md. 553, 561,121 A.2d 118,121 (1924) 
(authority given to county commissioners to contract for the construction of roads 
necessarily implied the power to complete construction in case of default by 
contractors). 
83. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Maryland-Washington Metropolitan Dist., 202 
Md. 293, 304-06, 96 A.2d 353, 358-59 (1953) (municipal corporation has implied 
power to convey real estate held in proprietary capacity). 
84. See, e.g., West v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R.R., 155 Md. 104, 114, 141 A. 509, 514 
(1928) (Public Service Commission has such implied powers as are necessary to 
enable it to exert its express powers). 
85. See, e.g., Smith v. Edwards, 292 Md. 60, 72-73, 437 A.2d 221, 227 (1981); Barlow v. 
Friendship Heights Comm., 276 Md. 89, 94-95, 344 A.2d 415, 418 (1975) (both 
recognizing implied powers of the Friendship Heights Citizens Committee). 
86. 303 Md. 544, 495 A.2d 30 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 12-20. 
87. C.l Mitchell & Best Co., 303 Md. at 571, 495 A.2d at 43-44. 
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held by many courts in other jurisdictions. In Contractors & Builders 
Association v. City of Dunedin, 88 for example, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida acknowledged the reasonableness of an impact fee imposed on new 
users of a water and sewerage system to defray the cost of expanding the 
facilities. 89 The court explained: 
In principle . . . we see nothing wrong with transferring to the 
new user of a municipally owned water or sewer system a fair 
share of the costs new use of the system involves. 
• • • 
Raising expansion capital by setting connection charges, which 
do not exceed a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated costs of 
expansion, is permissible where expansion is reasonably re-
quired, if use of the money collected is limited to meeting the 
costs of expansion. Users 'who benefit especially, not from the 
maintenance of the system, but by the extension of the system 
. . . should bear the cost of that extension.'9O 
The court rejected the argument that capital costs could be satisfied only 
by borrowing the necessary funds and then recovering the debt service 
costs through usage rates: 
We see no reason to require that a municipality resort to deficit 
financing, in order to raise capital by means of utility rates and 
charges. On the contrary, sound public policy militates against 
any such inflexibility. It may be a simpler technical task to 
amortize a known outlay, than to predict population trends and 
the other variables necessary to arrive at an accurate forecast of 
future capital needs. But raising capital for future use by 
means of rates and charges may permit a municipality to take 
advantage of favorable conditions, which would alter before 
money could be raised through issuance of debt securities .... 91 
Courts in at least seven other states have approved the legality and 
propriety of impact fees for water and sewer facilities under the particu-
lar statutes and ratemaking methodologies involved.92 
88. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976). 
89. Id. at 317-20. The court, however, held that the impact fee ordinance was invalid 
because it did not properly restrict the use of the proceeds of the impact fees. Id. at 
321; see also infra notes 108-113 and accompanying text. 
90. Contractor's & Builders Ass'n, 329 So. 2d at 317-18, 320 (emphasis in original) (foot-
note omitted) (quoting Hartman v. Aurora Sanitary Dist., 117 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ill. 
1961». 
91. Id. at 319-20 (footnote omitted). 
92. See, e.g., Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. App. 2d 533, 6 Cal. 
Rptr. 900 (I 960)(upholding a sewer charge on new subdivisions to pay their share of 
the cost of sewer expansion); Spalding v. Granite City, 415 Ill. 274, 113 N.E.2d 567 
(1953) (upholding a charge on new users to finance extension of a municipal sewer-
age system by new users); Heinrich v. City of Moline, 59 Ill. App. 3d 278, 375 
N.E.2d 572 (1978) (upholding tap-in fees for connection to water and sewer lines); 
City of Pontiac v. Mason, 50 Ill. App. 3d 102,365 N.E.2d 145 (1977) (upholding a 
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B. The Reasonableness of an Impact Fee Formula 
The standard which emerges from cases assessing the reasonableness 
of an impact fee formula is that a governmental body must make an ef-
fort to establish parity between current residents and the future residents 
upon whom the impact fees will be imposed. It may not impose the en-
tire cost of new facilities on new residents unless it can show that only 
they will benefit from the facilities. New customers may not be required 
to make more than a "fair contribution" toward the cost of new facilities 
which will be shared by others. 93 
In Jordon v. Village of Menomonee Fal/s,94 the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin developed a two-part "rational nexus" test for jUdging the rea-
sonableness of impact fees. The court held that (1) there must be a "rea-
sonable connection" between the need for the additional facilities 
financed by the impact fees and the growth generated by the new subdivi-
sion that will pay them; and (2) the impact fee proceeds must be ex-
pended for the "substantial benefit" of the new subdivision.9s The 
second component requires only that the use of the proceeds be "reason-
ably related" to the needs of the new subdivision and not that the new 
subdivision be the only beneficiary of the new facilities. Applying that 
test, the court upheld an impact fee ordinance designed to finance new 
schools and recreational facilities.96 
In Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 97 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
applied a similar standard in a related context. The court held that a 
county ordinance requiring a developer to reserve a right-of-way in a 
subdivision for a proposed state road would create an unconstitutional 
taking of the developer's property without compensation because there 
was no "reasonable nexus" between the need for the highway and the 
connection charge assessed against new users to recoup the capital costs of ex-
panding a water and sewer system); Marriott v. Springfield Sanitary Dist., 43 Ill. 
App. 3d 869, 357 N.E.2d 666 (1976) (upholding the assessment of connection 
charges against new users of a sewer system to finance expansion); Brandel v. Civil 
City of Lawrenceburg, 249 Ind. 47, 230 N.E.2d 778 (1967) (upholding a charge for 
connection to a new portion of a sewerage system); Englewood Hills, Inc. v. Village 
of Englewood, 14 Ohio App. 2d 195, 237 N.E.2d 621 (1967) (upholding tap-in 
charges to pay for the cost of future expansion of sewer and water facilities); Hayes 
v. City of Albany, 7 Or. App. 277, 490 P.2d 1018 (1971) (upholding a special con-
nection charge to fund construction and expansion of a sewer system); Van Voorhis 
v. Peters Creek Sanitary Auth., 60 Pa. Commw. 51,430 A.2d 1017 (1981) (uphold-
ing tapping fees as a proper means of financing a sewer construction project); Home 
Builders Ass'n v. Provo City, 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P.2d 451 (1972) (upholding as 
"reasonable and nondiscriminatory" a connection fee for new users to provide funds 
to improve and enlarge a sewer system). 
93. Airwick Indus., Inc. v.' Carlstadt Sewerage Auth., 57 N.J. 107,270 A.2d 18 (1970), 
appeal dismissed. cerro denied, 402 U.S. 967 (1971). 
94. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1966). 
95. Id. at 44748. 
96. Id. at 448. 
97. 301 Md. 256,482 A.2d 908 (1984). 
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new subdivision.98 
In Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City,99 the Supreme 
Court of Utah identified seven factors to be considered in evaluating the 
reasonableness of an impact fee formula: (1) the cost of existing capital 
facilities; (2) the manner of financing existing capital facilities (such as 
user charges, special assessments, bonded indebtedness, general taxes, or 
federal grants); (3) the relative extent to which newly developed proper-
ties as well as other properties in the municipality have already contrib-
uted to the cost of existing capital facilities (by such means as property 
taxes and special assessments); (4) the relative extent to which the newly 
developed properties and other properties in the municipality will con-
tribute to the cost of existing capital facilities in the future (by payment 
of uniform user charges); (5) the extent to which the newly developed 
properties are entitled to a credit because the municipality is requiring 
the developers or owners (by contractual arrangement or otherwise) to 
provide common facilities (inside or outside the proposed development) 
that have been provided by the municipality and financed through gen-
eral taxation or other means in other parts of the municipality; (6) the 
extraordinary costs, if any, of providing service to the newly developed 
properties; and (7) the time-price differential inherent in fair comparisons 
of amounts paid at different times. 100 The Banberry approach is a sound 
analytical model and should be considered when determining the reason-
ableness of impact fee formulas. 
No Maryland appellate court has yet ruled on the reasonableness of 
an impact fee formula; however, in the unreported decision of the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County in the Offset Charge case,101 Judge Wil-
liam C. Miller adopted the "fair contribution" approach of Ban berry and 
found that WSSC's Offset Charge was unreasonably calculated. Accord-
ing to Judge Miller, the Offset Charge was based on hypothetical condi-
tions and did not reflect the extent to which existing users had benefited 
from state and federal grants to finance the construction of WSSC's ex-
isting system. 102 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence to support the reasonableness 
of an impact fee would be a rate study, especially one prepared by an 
independent expert before the charge is adopted. These rate studies, 
which are typically prepared by accounting firms, set forth the analytical 
bases for the charge and quantify the costs to be financed, so as to pro-
vide the counties with independent justification for the reasonableness of 
their particular impact fee. 
98. [d. at 280-82, 482 A.2d at 920-21. For further discussion of the case, see infra text 
accompanying notes 130-32. 
99. 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981). 
100. [d. at 903. 
101. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
102. C.I. Mitchell & Best Co. v. WSSC, Equity No. 77016, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order (May 14, 1984), at 57-65, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 303 Md. 544, 495 
A.2d 30 (1985). The Court of Appeals of Maryland did not reach this issue. 
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C Standard of Review 
In determining whether an impact fee is reasonably calculated, a 
court should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the 
governmental body. As the Maryland Court of Appeals explained in up-
holding the City of Cumberland's water rate structure in Lewis v. 
Cumberland: 103 
The courts are not managers of municipal utilities and have no 
ratemaking powers. . . . The question before [them] is not 
whether ... rate ordinances embody the best possible classifica-
tion of rates (which is not a judicial question), but whether the 
ordinance . . . is so unjustly discriminatory and therefore so 
clearly unreasonable that it is invalid. 104 
The issue properly before a reviewing court is not whether it could 
devise some alternative to the governmental body's ratemaking determi-
nations. Rather, the issue is (1) whether the rates or charges are illegal, 
arbitrary or capricious in any respect and, if not, (2) whether there is 
sufficient evidence of the reasonableness of those determinations to show 
that a reasoning mind could have come to the result reached by the gov-
ernmental body. IDS The Maryland Court of Appeals implicitly applied 
this standard of review in Northampton Corp. v. Washington Suburban 
Sanitary Commission.106 In Northampton, the court rejected the argu-
ment that the Interim Charge was unreasonably applied by WSSC, ex-
plaining that WSSC "must be allowed reasonable latitude" in making 
subclassifications of property and that its ratemaking decisions "should 
not be disturbed" in the "absence of a showing of arbitrariness or bad 
faith .... "107 
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF IMPACT FEES .. 
For an impact fee to be validly imposed, courts appear to require 
that the funds collected under such a program be specifically earmarked 
for the purpose for which the fee is imposed. For example, in Contrac-
tors & Builders Association v. City of Dunedin 108 the Supreme Court of 
Florida struck down an ordinance under which impact fees had been 
imposed because use of the proceeds was not properly restricted. 109 The 
court noted that: 
103. 189 Md. 58, 54 A.2d 319 (1946). 
104. Id. at 66, 69, 54 A.2d at 323, 324. 
105. See generally City of Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383, 394-99, 
396 A.2d 1080, 1087-89 (1979) (discussing the general standard of review for re-
viewing agency action). 
106. 278 Md. 677, 366 A.2d 377 (1976); see also supra notes 21-24 and accompanying 
text. 
107. Northampton Corp., 278 Md. at 688, 366 A.2d at 384. 
108. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976). 
109. Id. at 320-21. 
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The failure to include necessary restrictions on the use of the 
fund is bound to result in confusion, at best. City personnel 
may come and go before the fund is exhausted, yet there is 
nothing in writing to guide their use of these moneys, although 
certain uses, even within the water and sewer systems, would 
undercut the legal basis for the fund's existence. There is no 
justification for such casual handling of public moneys, and we 
therefore hold that the ordinance is defective for failure to spell 
out necessary restrictions on the use of fees it authorizes to be 
collected. 1 10 
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In the circuit court decision in Cl Mitchell & Best Co., Judge Miller 
similarly found that WSSC had failed to adopt adequate guidelines re-
stricting the use and handling of moneys collected under the Offset 
Charge and held the Offset Charge to be invalid for this reason. III 
Anne Arundel County resolved this concern for proper restriction 
of impact fees by creating Transportation and School Impact Fee Special 
Funds in the ordinance establishing its impact fee program. 1 12 Section 7-
108 of the ordinance provides that impact fee proceeds "shall be depos-
ited in the appropriate special fund to ensure that the fees and all interest 
accruing to the special fund are designated for improvements reasonably 
attributable to new development and are expended to reasonably benefit 
the new development."113 
v. FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS RESPECTING 
IMPACT FEES 
The Supreme Court recently held in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission 114 that certain land use regulations will, if challenged, be 
held to a strict standard of review to determine whether they cause a 
taking for which the fifth amendment requires compensation. 1 IS This 
standard will likely be cited by litigants challenging impact fees as caus-
ing an unconstitutional taking. For example, a landowner who cannot 
obtain a building permit until he pays an impact fee may complain that 
the requirement unreasonably frustrates the use of his land and therefore 
constitutes a "taking" without just compensation. 
110. [d. at 321. 
111. C.1. Mitchell & Best Co. v. WSSC, Equity No. 77016, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order (May 14, 1984), at 65-68, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 303 Md. 544, 495 
A.2d 30 (1985). 
112. See Anne Arundel County Bill No. 50-87, introduced July 20, 1987 and adopted 
August 5, 1987 (codified at ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY CODE art. 24, §§ 7-101 to 
-113 (1988». 
113. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY CODE art. 24, § 7-108 (1988). 
114. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
115. The fifth amendment provides in relevant part: "nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme 
Court has held that the fifth amendment applies to the states through the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
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Nollan was brought by two California landowners who had been 
denied a permit to replace a run-down beach bungalow with a larger, 
three-bedroom house because they refused to grant an easement allowing 
the public to have lateral access across their beach. 116 The California 
Coastal Commission had refused to issue the permit unless the Nollans 
would agree to grant the easement, reasoning that the new house would 
interfere with "visual access" and would create a "psychological barrier" 
to the public beaches. 117 The Commission's objective was to ensure that 
the public could walk along the beach between a public park located 
north of the Nollans' property and a public beach south of the prop-
erty.IIS The Commission had imposed similar restrictions on forty-three 
other new development projects since 1979. 119 The Nollans sued the 
Commission, arguing that the denial of an unconditional permit 
amounted to an unconstitutional taking of their property without 
compensation. 
In a five-to-four decision written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme 
Court agreed with the Nollans, holding that a government cannot impose 
a restriction on a building permit unless the restriction substantially ad-
vances a legitimate state interest. 12o When the state imposes a condition 
on new development, the Court ruled, there must be a substantial 
"nexus" between that condition and some injury to the public interest 
caused by the development. 121 Justice Scalia could not discern a substan-
tial nexus between the alleged harm from development of the Nollans' 
property (e.g., blocking the public's view of the beach) and the award of 
additional lateral access rights across the beach behind the Nollans' 
house. 122 Access to the beach was not substantially furthered by the per-
mit's requirement of an easement along the beach. On the other hand, 
the Court specifically noted that it would have been constitutionally per-
missible to condition the permit on height restrictions, width restrictions, 
a ban on fences, or even the requirement that the Nollans provide a view-
ing spot on their property. 123 
Four Justices, in three separate opinions, dissented in Nollan. 124 
They contended that the majority's substantial nexus requirement im-
properly changed the traditional standard of measuring public actions, 
under which merely a "rational relationship" between the regulation and 
a public end must be identified. 12s 
116. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143. 
117. [d. at 3143-44. 
118. [d. 
119. [d. at 3144. 
120. [d. at 3150. 
121. [d. at 3147-48. 
122. [d. at 3149. 
123. [d. at 3147-48. 
124. [d. at 3150-62 (Brennan & Marshall, 11., dissenting), 3162-63 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting), 3163-64 (Stevens & Blackmun, 11., dissenting). 
125. [d. at 3151-54 (Brennan & Marshall, 11., dissenting). 
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Nollan is thus properly viewed as a case turning on the appropriate 
standard of review to be applied in evaluating a governmental regulation. 
The majority decision holds that there must be a "close fit" or "substan-
tial nexus" between the regulatory exaction and the condition created by 
the development. In a footnote, Justice Scalia asserted that the Court's 
prior decisions established that the standard for evaluating land use ac-
tions was not the same as that applied to due process or equal protection 
challenges to governmental actions. l26 According to Justice Scalia, the 
Court has required that a challenged land use regulation "substantially 
advance" the "legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved,l27 not 
that "the State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure adopted 
might achieve the State's objective,"l28 as Justice Brennan argued in his 
dissent. l29 Whatever the merits of this debate about the Court's prior 
decisions, Nollan makes clear that there will be a different standard of 
review in future cases. 
The importance of Nollan to an analysis of impact fees is that it 
establishes a strict standard of review for challenged land use actions. In 
the future, this standard may be applied in a variety of contexts, includ-
ing evaluation of whether an impact fee causes an unconstitutional 
taking. 
Additionally, in Nollan, the Supreme Court cited with apparent ap-
proval the holding of the Maryland Court of Appeals in H9ward County 
v. JJM, Inc. 130 In JJM, Inc., the court held that the county's requirement 
that a developer reserve a right-of-way for a road in a subdivision was an 
unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation because 
there was no "reasonable nexus" between the exaction and the impact 
created by the subdivision. 13l The Supreme Court suggested that the 
Maryland court's "reasonable nexus" standard was "consistent" with the 
test applied in Nollan.132 Thus, an advocate could argue that Nollan and 
JJM, Inc. together establish that impact fees must satisfy the strict stan-
dard of review applied in those cases. Unless impact fees meet this 
heightened standard, their imposition may violate the fifth amendment's 
prohibition against takings without just compensation. 
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION IMPLICATIONS OF IMPACT FEES 
It may be argued that the imposition of impact fees on new develop-
ment only, and not on existing properties, would deny to new residents 
the "equal protection of the laws"l33 because they alone would pay for 
126. Id. at 3147 n.3. 
127: Id. (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
128. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)). 
129. Id. at 3151. (Brennan & Marshall, 11., dissenting). 
130. 301 Md. 256, 280-82, 482 A.2d 908, 920-21 (1984) (cited in Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 
3149); see also supra text accompanying notes 98-99. 
131. JJM. Inc., 301 Md. at 282, 482 A.2d at 920-21. 
132. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148-49. 
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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public facilities which might be used by all residents. In his opinion ad-
dressing Ocean City's proposed beach restoration impact fee,134 for ex-
ample, the Attorney General of Maryland noted that the proposal raised 
equal protection concerns because "the purchasers or lessees of new de-
velopment would ultimately pay all of Ocean City'S share of the beach 
restoration project costs, even though many others would also benefit 
from the project."13S He concluded, however, that the proposal "would 
more likely than not be sustained against an Equal Protection Clause 
challenge" because there was a rational basis supporting the city's impact 
fee plan. 136 
The real question, according to the Attorney General, was how 
close a relationship is required between the impact of new development 
(measured by the increase in demand for community services) and the 
government expenditures to be financed by the impact fees. 137 Aware of 
no cases applying the rational basis test to impact fees, the Attorney 
General turned to analogous case law on special assessments. To avoid 
equal protection problems, assessments must be "levied against landown-
ers in proportion to the benefit they receive through the public improve-
ment."138 Beyond this basic proportionality requirement, special 
assessments generally are presumed "valid and constitutional."139 Mu-
nicipalities have broad discretion to classify groups or properties that will 
be subject to assessments. 140 
So broad is the discretion granted to municipal authorities that some 
special assessments have been upheld even though they were imposed 
disproportionately on new development. 141 In those cases, according to 
the Attorney General, courts have held that new development may reach 
a point where certain public improvements become necessary instead of 
merely desirable. 142 The impact on the public infrastructure justifies the 
disproportionate charges on the new development. "Otherwise put, 
courts have sometimes viewed new development as the final 'straw that 
broke the camel's back,' forcing the municipality to undertake public im-
provements it previously thought of as potentially beneficial but not im-
mediately imperative."143 The conclusion from these cases is that while 
proportionality is required between the benefit received from public im-
134. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. 87 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 62-75. 
135. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. at 90. 
136. Id. at 87, 91. 
137. Id. at 91. 
138. Id. at 92. 
139. Id. at 93. 
14O.Id. 
141. Id.; see, e.g., Ivy Steel & Wire Co. v. Jacksonville, 401 F. Supp. 701, 705 (M.D. Fla. 
1975); Home Builders Ass'n v. Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832,835 (Mo. 1977); Deer-
field Estates, Inc. v. East Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498 (1972); Call v. 
West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257, 1258-59 (Utah 1980); Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 
Wis. 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1966). 
142. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. at 93. 
143. Id. 
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provements and the burden imposed on new development, strict equality 
is not required. 144 
In Northampton Corp. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-
sion, 145 the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected an equal protection chal-
lenge to a special connection charge. Responding to a directive from the 
state health department, WSSC had planned to build three "interim" 
sewage treatment plants to expand WSSC's capacity until larger, perma-
nent plants could be built. 146 To finance the construction of the interim 
facilities, WSSC resolved to impose an Interim Sewer Service Charge 
("Interim Charge") on all new connections to the sewer system in the 
entire sanitary district until the permanent facilities had begun to oper-
ate. 147 A group of thirteen property owners filed suit to enjoin WSSC 
from collecting the Interim Charge. Among their contentions was that 
WSSC had violated their equal protection rights by making "arbitrary 
and unreasonable distinctions between members of the same class of 
property owners." 148 The basis of their argument was that under the 
Interim Charge plan: (1) current residents of the sanitary district would 
benefit from the interim facilities but were not required to pay the In-
terim Charge; (2) current residents converting from a private septic sys-
tem to the public sewer system were required to pay only one-third of the 
Interim Charge; (3) trailer lots, churches, schools, and certain public 
buildings were required to pay only one-half of the normal Interim 
Charge for comparable business or commercial users; and (4) property 
owners building a new house on a vacant lot were required to pay the full 
Interim Charge. 149 The court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' equal 
protection argument without mentioning any need for proportionality 
between benefits received and burdens imposed. Instead, the court sim-
ply held that "the Commission must be allowed reasonable latitude in 
making these subclassifications, and that in the absence of bad faith . . . 
that part of its resolution should not be disturbed."150 
In CL Mitchell & Best Co. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Com-
mission, lSI the Circuit Court for Montgomery County followed North-
ampton and rejected a similar equal protection challenge to WSSC's 
144. Id. at 94. 
145. 278 Md. 677, 366 A.2d 377 (1976). For a discussion of another aspect of the 
case, see supra text accompanying notes 21-24. 
146. Northampton Corp., 278 Md. at 680,366 A.2d at 379. 
147.Id. 
148. Id. at 687, 366 A.2d at 383. 
149. Id. at 688, 366 A.2d at 383. 
150. Id. at 688,366 A.2d at 384. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court implicitly conceded 
that the Interim Charge was analogous to a special assessment because the plaintiffs 
were "specially benefited by being permitted to make the sewer connections" which 
they had been denied previously. The fact that their particular properties would not 
be served by the interim facilities was inconsequential. Id. at 684, 366 A.2d at 381. 
151. Equity No. 77016, Memorandum Opinion and Order (May 14, 1984), aff'd in pan, 
rev'd in part, 303 Md. 544, 495 A.2d 30 (1985). For a discussion of other aspects of 
the case, see supra text accompanying notes 12-20 & 86-87. 
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Offset Charge. ls2 Under the Offset Charge plan, existing dwelling units 
converting from a private well and/or septic tank to the public water 
and/or sewer system were charged a lower fee than new dwelling units 
connecting to the public system. IS3 The plaintiffs contended that the dif-
ferent classifications were not reasonably related to the Offset Charge's 
purpose of having new customers bear the cost of expanding the sys-
tem. IS4 WSSC argued that it was reasonable to give credit to residents 
who had invested in private facilities because their homes previously 
were not served by the public system. ISS The court cited Northampton 
and held that the Offset Charge rate classifications did not violate the 
plaintiffs' equal protection rights. IS6 
Courts in other states also have rejected equal protection challenges 
to impact fees. In Ivy Steel & Wire Co. v. City of Jacksonville, IS7 for 
example, the imposition of a water pollution control charge solely on new 
development was upheld, even though existing landowners and others 
would benefit from pollution control as much as new residents. The 
court reasoned that imposing the fee on new development only was fair 
and proper because that development created the "immediate need" for 
the pollution control work. ISS 
It is quite unlikely that impact fees will be challenged successfully 
on equal protection grounds. If an impact fee passes the reasonableness 
test, discussed above, it will also necessarily meet the deferential "ra-
tional basis" standard used in evaluating equal protection challenges to 
economic regulations. ls9 • 
VII. PUBLIC UTILITY IMPACT FEE 
At least one attempt has been made to apply the impact fee concept 
outside of the municipal context. In In re Maryland Marine Utilities, 
Inc. ,160 the Public Service Commission of Maryland considered the first 
impact fee to be proposed by an investor-owned public utility. Maryland 
Marine Utilities, Inc. provided water and sewer services in the Ocean 
Pines development in Worcester County.t61 It sought authority to im-
pose on all proposed dwelling units in its service territory, for which a 




156. Id. This part of the decision was left undisturbed on appeal. 
157. 401 F. Supp. 701 (M.D. Fla. 1975). 
158. ld. at 705. 
159. Unless a classification affects fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inher-
ently suspect distinctions such as race, religion or alienage, the constitutionality of 
the distinction is presumed, and the challenged classification must only be shown to 
be "rationally related" to a legitimate state interest. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 
427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
160. Order No. 67475, dated September 9, 1986, Case No. 7892, Public Service Commis-
sion of Maryland. 
161. Id. at 2. 
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building permit had not yet been issued by the county, a one-time "Plant 
Expansion Charge" in the amount of $1,340 to finance the expansion of a 
sewage treatment plant to serve those units. 162 Ocean Pines was subject 
to a health department building moratorium because its existing sewage 
treatment plant was operating at capacity. The Commission rejected the 
charge principally because it represented a departure from the Commis-
sion's traditional ratemaking principle under which needed capital is 
loaned to or invested in a utility and the costs of securing that capital are 
passed on to all of a utility'S ratepayers.163 Public Service Commissioner 
William A. Badger dissented, arguing that the charge would more equi-
tably assign the costs associated with the expansion of the treatment 
plant to the new residents who caused the need for, and would benefit 
from, the expansion. l64 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Both the federal courts and courts in other states have held that 
impact fees, if reasonable and if properly applied, are a permissible means 
of raising funds for capital improvements so long as statutory authority 
for imposing the fees is present. In Maryland, statutory authority to im-
pose impact fees depends upon the nature of the powers specifically 
granted to individual counties. At present, the smallest municipal corpo-
rations in the state are authorized to impose impact fees while the largest 
and most populous counties are not. 
This anomaly should be corrected. The General Assembly should 
pass an enabling law giving all counties and municipal corporations the 
power to impose impact fees. Such a grant of power would not necessar-
ily require every county and municipal corporation to finance capital im-
provements with impact fees, but the fees could be imposed should local 
officials determine that they are called for under the conditions prevailing 
in their jurisdiction. 
Impact fees can achieve an appropriate allocation of the costs of 
providing capital improvements to the new residents who create the need 
for these improvements. If properly calculated and imposed, they repre-
sent a fair method of sharing the cost of public improvements among old 
and new residents. Uniform statewide authority to impose the fees is 
necessary if Maryland's local government officials are to have the flexibil-
ity they need to deal with the continuing fiscal challenges caused by de-
creasing federal and state revenue sharing and taxpayer opposition to 
paying higher local taxes. By giving local governments the means to pay 
for capital improvements in a fair and appropriate manner, impact fees 
allow development to go forward. 
162. [d. at 1. 
163. [d. at 5-8. 
164. [d. at 4-9 (Commissioner William A. Badger, dissenting). 
